Do you mean instead of the l-word or other terms that I reckon ought to be referred to as X-word?
If the former, there is already a huge array of terms in use to talk about the L-word. If the second, then the T-word, for technology is one. What follows is an early draft version of a chapter. The earlier scribble picked up much of this argument. There are a few more links here that might be useful:
The T-word and related things
Before we develop the contrast, we need to be clear how we use the term technology from here on in this chapter. Common usage is to have the word refer to the material artefacts, the hardware and software. We argue that while it is a linguistic convenience, there are problems that come from thinking about the issues at hand in this way. To begin, we draw on an argument of Ursula Franklin’s (1990) who posits technology as formalised practice. She develops this notion from Kenneth Boulding’s notion of technology as ways of doing things. So we can speak and think of a technology of painting, of gardening, of sailing, even of establishing factors that favour integration of computers in classrooms. This is a more holistic way of thinking about the T-word. Franklin makes the point of situating technology in culture, in specific contexts. We argue that this goes part of the way but effectively is a move that only morphs one binary into another: the social technical binary becomes ways of doing things and their contexts. These epistemological shufflings can go on indefinitely, cutting up representations of reality(ies) in order to better suit the purpose.
From here we want to further develop our approach to the T-word. We want to argue, following Pickering(1995), Barad (2003) and Mulcahy(2010) that a performative idiom allows us to move out of the quandaries of binary shuffling. The idiom suggests a consideration of practices, of doings, of actions. In this idiom, technologies are effects of practices, not stand alone things waiting to be represented. Barad (2003) makes the point:
representationalism is the belief in the ontological distinction between representations and that which they purport to represent; in particular, that which is represented is held to be independent of all practices of representing. (p. 804)
Usefully, she continues and examines the origins of representationalism, arguing, following Rouse (1996), that representationalism is a Cartesian legacy,
a linguistic variation on Descartes’ insistence that we have a direct and privileged access to the contents of our thoughts that we lack towards the “external” world. (p. 209)
Thus the performative idiom turns things on their heads, so to speak. Rather than beginning with a fixed set of components, factors or predispositions that require representation, it prompts us to consider the practices that enact integration-realities, such as the papers we cited earlier in this chapter, such as this chapter. A key question then is, how realities get done in practice. How, for instance, are teachers, their students, the computers in the classroom enacted in integration-realities? Or, put another way, teachers, their students and the computers which are the focus of concerns about integration are all effects of practices.
Barad, K., 2003 Posthumanist Performativity: Toward an Understanding of How Matter Comes to Matter, pp. 801-831 in ￼Signs: Journal of Women in Culture and Society.
Franklin, U., 1990 The Real World of Technology. CBC Enterprises, Montreal.
Mulcahy, D., 2010 Assembling the ‘Accomplished’ Teacher: The performativity and politics of professional teaching standards. [i]Educational Philosophy and Theory[i] 43: 94-113.
Pickering, A., 1995 The mangle of practice : time, agency, and science. University of Chicago Press, Chicago.
Rouse, J., 1996 Engaging Science: How to Understand Its Practices Philosophically. Cornell University Press, Ithaca, N.Y.
The final version did not use the t-word device it is:
Bigum, C., & Rowan, L. (2015). A gorilla in their midst: rethinking educational technology. In S. Bulfin, N. Johnson & C. Bigum (Eds.), Killer apps: Critical perspectives on technology and education (pp. 15-34): Palgrave.